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Abstract
This paper challenges one of the main conclusions of the literature on standard
that high achievers always beneﬁt from a rise in the standard. In fact, we show that
exactlly the opposite may occur. The reason is that a higher standard may make
impossible for relatively high able students from low income families background
to pass the new standard. The expected productivity of those who pass the standard
falls and, consequently, their wages.
JEL Classiﬁcation: I2, J24.
1 Introduction
The theoretical literature indicates that the most-able students/workers are clear bene-
ﬁciaries of an increase in the educational standards. Examples are Costrell (1994) and
Betts (1998). In particular, Betts (1998) shows that, if workers are differentiated with
respect to ability, a rise in the standards leads to an increase in the wages of both the
highest and lowest ability workers. The only workers who are harmed by this change
are those who no longer meet the higher standard.
However, these theoretical results contrast with the empirical evidence. On the
one hand, Costrell and Betts (2000) indicates that the most vocal opposition to a rise
in standards comes from high achievers. On the other hand, Dee and Jacob (2006)
analysis the impact on subsequent earnings of more difﬁcult exit exams. They ﬁnd that
it tends to reduce the earnings of white and hispanic students, while increasing those
of black students.
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1The objective of this paper is to reconcile the theory with the empirical evidence
by showing that a rise in the standard may actually harm the high achievers students
by reducing their wages. In order to accomplish it, we modify Betts (1998)’s model
in two main dimensions. First, we use a signaling model and not a hybrid human
capital/signaling model as in his paper. Worker’s productivity depends solely on his
ability. Attending school does not add to student’s productivity1. However, passing
the standard signals to ﬁrms the expected productivity of the worker. Second, students
may come from different family income backgrounds. Hence, students differ in two
dimensions: ability as in Betts (1998)’s model, as well as in income.
With these features, high achievers students may lose from a rise in the standard.
Their wages may fall, while increasing the wages of those who initially fail to meet the
standard. The students who no longer meet the higher standard are also harmed by this
change. The intution behing this result is the following. If workers are differentiated
with respect to ability, an increase in educational standards may make impossible for
the most able workers from more constrained families to pass the higher standards.
Thus, the new pool of workers who obtain the degree is perceived, on average, by the
employees to be of lower quality and then receive a lower wage.
This paper is divided in four sections, including this introduction. The next section
presents the model. Then we show the results. The last section concludes.
2 Model
We develop a signaling model. Attendance at school does not add to student’s pro-
ductivity. Firms can only observe the standard which each student meets: those who
graduate from high school and those who do not2. This information signals to ﬁrms the
expected productivity of each worker.
Studentsdifferintwoaspects: ability(a)andavailabetime(T). acanassumethree
possible values: 0 (low ability),a1 (middle ability),a2 (high ability), where a2 > a1 >
0, ∀i. T can assume two possible values:

T,T − ∆
	
, where ∆ ∈

0,T

. Hence,
students are characterized by the pair (a,T) and there are six types: A =
 
a2,T

,
B =
 
a2,T − ∆

, C =
 
a1,T

, D =
 
a1,T − ∆

, E =
 
0,T

, F =
 
0,T − ∆

(see ﬁgure 1). The proportion of each type in the population is equal to pi, pi > 0, ∀i,
i ∈ S ≡ {A,..,F}, where
P
i∈S pi = 1.
1This is the classical worker self-selection from a menu of contracts story as described in Kreps (1990).
As it is going to be clear later, ﬁrms offer two types of contracts, one to those students who pass the standard
and another to the ones who do not pass it. Students decide to pass or not the standard in (correct) anticipation
of those offers from the ﬁrms.
2The assumption that there is no perfect information and ﬁrms can not observe student productivity and
pay corresponding wages is traditional in the theoretical literature on standards. As pointed out by Costrell
(1994), in the hiring process, ﬁrms do rely more on the high-school diploma than on other variables, such as
employment testing and school transcripts.
2Rich Poor
A = (a2,T) High ability B = (a2,T − ∆)
C = (a1,T) Medium ability D = (a1,T − ∆)
E = (0,T) Low ability F = (0,T − ∆)
Figure 1: The six possible types, considering ability and income (available
time for study).
∆ indicates the difference in the available time across students. The greater is
∆, the more unequal is the available time for students. The difference in available
time across student tries to capture the notion that individuals have different levels of
resources to invest in their education. One can think that the more constrained students
have to work part of the time. As a consequence they have less time to distribute
between leisure and school effort.3 Implicitly it is assumed that there is no capital
markets to ﬁnance investments in education.4
There are two different wages (lifetime earnings): wl for the low achievers (those
who fail the exam) and wh for the high achievers (those who pass the exam). A student
can devote his time either to leisure (L) or to make effort to obtain the high school
degree (e). Student i maximizes utility, which depends on leisure (Li) and lifetime
earnings (wi) :
U = U (Li,wi) subject to Li ∈ [0,Ti].
Student i pass the standard πs set by school if: g (ei,ai) > πs, where g1 > 0,
g11 6 0, g2 > 0, g22 6 0, g12 > 0 and g (0,.) = g (.,0) = 0. Note that assumption
g (.,0) = 0 guarantees that students with low ability do not have any incentive to spend
his time to pass the standard and, then, never pass the non-trivial standard. It means
that as e(0,π) = 0, ∀π. The necessary effort by student i to pass the standard πs can
be deﬁned by the following function e(ai,πs). Obviously, Ti = Li + ei.
The marginal product of a worker (or his productivity) is equal to his ability a.
As pointed out above, ﬁrms cannot observe the ability of students directly. But they
3Alternatively, one can think that T is the amount of resources that the student has available to invest in
his education. T is greater the richer is the student. This investment can lead to a greater future lifetime
earnings if he obtain the high school degree.
4This assumption is commonly used and widely accepted in the literature. See Becker (1993) for an
extensive discussion on this topic.
3do observe whether the student obtains the high school degree, and thus they infer his
expected productivity. Perfect competition in the labor market implies that workers
are paid their expected product conditional on whether they have met the standard.
Therefore, worker either belong to the group of students who have met or exceed the
standard πs (whose wage is equal to wh) , or to the group of workers who have not met
the standard (whose wage is equal to wl). Note that wages are constant within each
group due to the unobservability of ability.
Before turning to the results, we deﬁne the following notation. Let wi (P), i = h,l,
be the wage when the equilibrium is such that the partition P contains the types of stu-
dents who pass the standard. For example, if P = {A,B,C,D}, then it means that
typesA,B,C andD passthestandard, andtheircorrespondingwageiswh (A,B,C,D).
3 Results
We ﬁrst show that the model replicates the results in Betts (1998) when there is no
income inequality, that is, when ∆ = 0.
Proposition 1: Given ∆ = 0, there are b π, π and π such that (i) when π ∈ (0,b π]
the partition {A,B,C,D} represents the types of students who pass the standard; (ii)
when π ∈ [π,π], b π 6 π < π, the partition {A,B} represents the types of students
who pass the standard; (iii) wh (A,B,C,D) < wh (A,B) and wl (A,B,C,D) <
wl (A,B).
The ﬁrst part of the above proposition shows that there is an equilibrium in which
studentstypesA, B, C andD passtheexamandtypesE andF donot, whentheschool
standard takes values in the range (0,b π].5 The second part indicates what happens
with the equilibrium when the standard rises beyond b π and at a level lower than π.
Now, it is not anymore in the interest of students types C and D to pass the standard
as it is too costly for individuals with their ability. Recall that their average ability
(or productivity) are lower and greater, respectively, than the average one of those
students who continue passing the standard (types A and B) and continue not passing
the standard (types E and F).
Therefore, on the one hand, when they leave the group of students who pass the
standard, the average productivity of those who stay rises and, hence, their wages  
wh (A,B,C,D) < wh (A,B)

. On the other hand, when they join the group of indi-
viduals who do not pass the standard, they increase its average productivity and hence
its wage
 
wl (A,B,C,D) < wl (A,B)

. The only students who are worst off with the
increase in the standard are types C and D. The reason is that they receive a lower
wage in comparison with the previous equilibrium, with a lower standard. This is the
intuition behing the last result of proposition 1 and it is precisely the one obtained in
Betts (1998). That is, an increase in the standard rises the wages of workers of highest
and lowest abilities, whereas it reduces the wages of those workers who no longer meet
the standard.
5Note that when π = 0 the standard is trivial and all students pass the exam. When the standard is greater
than π no student passes the exam and we also have a trivial equilibrium.
4Beforeproceedingwiththeanalysis, wedeﬁneΩP =

(∆,π) ∈ R2 : P is the partition
	
.
Proposition 2: Ω{A,B,C} 6= ∅ and contains an open set.
The above proposition shows that there is an equilibrium in which students types
{A,B,C} pass the exam and types {D,E,F} do not. This equilibrium exists for the
following reason. When ∆ is positive, it is more costly to students types {B,D,F} to
pass any standard as they have less available time. In particular, for a given standard π,
there are certain levels for the income distribution in which type B is better off passing
the standard and type D is not. Despite having the same ability as type D, type C
chooses to pass the standard as it has a greater available time.
We now show the main result of the paper.
Proposition 3: (i) there are ∆, π1 and π2, where π2 > π1, such that: (∆,π1) ∈
Ω{A,B,C} and (∆,π2) ∈ Ω{A,C}; (ii) wh (A,B,C) > wh (A,C) and wl (A,B,C) <
wl (A,C).
The ﬁrst part of proposition shows the following. Departing from the equilibrium
found in proposition 2, where types A, B and C pass the standard, and without chang-
ing the income distribution, there is an increase in the standard such that students type
B, despite of having a high ability, no longer meet the standard. They are constrained
by the relatively low available time. The other types of students do not change their
choices. Hence, only types A and C pass the new standard.
Note that, when this change in the equilibrium occurs due to the higher standard,
there is also a change in the equilibrium wages, as shown in the second part of the
proposition. Students type B’s ability (or productivity) is greater than the average
one of the students who keep passing the exam (students types A and C). There-
fore, when they leave this group, its overall productivity falls and, hence, its wage  
wh (A,B,C) > wh (A,C)

. This change also leads to a rise in the wage of the group
of individuals who do not pass the higher standard (types B, D, E and F), that is,
wl (A,B,C) < wl (A,C). It occurs because students of type B increase its overall
productivity when they join this group.
Note that the beneﬁciaries of a rise in the standard are students types D, E and
F, whose salaries increase. Types A, B and C are worst off because their salaries are
lower. Students type B suffer the greatest fall in salary, as they fail to meet the higher
standard.
Therefore, we show that, in contrast with the literature on standard, an increase
in the standard may harm the students who still pass a higher standard by reducing
their wages. It is important to mention that this result is not driven by any special
characteristic of this framework with only six types of students. We adopt discrete
types because it facilitates the transmission of the intuition behind the result and the
algebraic solution, but what is driving this result is the fact that the individuals from
low income families who no longer pass the standard may have an average productivity
greater than the ones of those students who keep passing the greater standard and are
not constrained. This result can also occur in a framework with many ability levels or
a continuum of them.
54 Conclusion
One of the main conclusions of the literature on education is that high achievers always
beneﬁt from a rise in the standard. This paper challenges this ﬁnding. In fact, we show
that exactly the opposite may occur. The main result of this paper is that if students
differ in ability and income, and if school does not add to student’s productivity but
passing the standard signals to ﬁrms the expected productivity of the worker, then high
achievers’wagesmay fall. This resultisdueto thefactthatahigher standard maymake
impossible for relatively high able students from low income families background to
pass the new standard and reduce the expected productivity of those who pass the
standard.
This new result is in line with the empirical evidence that shows that high achiev-
ers in general oppose higher standards and subsequent earnings may fall when more
difﬁcult exit exams are imposed.
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5 Appendix
Proposition 1 Given ∆ = 0, there are b π, π and π such that: (i) when π ∈ (0,b π]
the partition {A,B,C,D} represents the types of students who pass the standard; (ii)
when π ∈ [π,π], b π 6 π < π, the partition {A,B} represents the types of students
who pass the standard; (iii) wh (A,B,C,D) < wh (A,B) and wl (A,B,C,D) <
wl (A,B).
Proof. The proof of (iii) is straightforward. We have:
wh (A,B,C,D) =
(pA + pB)a2 + (pC + pD)a1
(pA + pB + pC + pD)
< a2 = wh (A,B), as a2 > a1,
6wl (A,B,C,D) = 0 <
(pC + pD)a1
(pC + pD + pE + pF)
= wl (A,B), as a1 > 0.
We now turn to the proof of (i). When ∆ = 0 and the standard is π, the following
conditions must be satisﬁed in order for the partition {A,B,C,D} to represent the
types of students who pass the standard:
u

T − e(a1,π);wh (A,B,C,D)

> u

T;wl (A,B,C,D)

, (1)
u

T − e(0,π);wh (A,B,C,D)

< u

T;wl (A,B,C,D)

. (2)
Inequality (2) is satisﬁed for any π > 0 as g (.,0) = 0 and e(0,π) = 0. Deﬁne
b π such that: u

T − e(a1,b π);wh (A,B,C,D)

= u

T;wl (A,B,C,D)

. Due to the
fact that u1 > 0 and e2 > 0, inequality (1) is satisﬁed for any π, π ∈ [0,b π]. Then
when π ∈ (0,b π], the partition {A,B,C,D} represents the types of students who pass
the standard.
Finally, we prove (ii). When ∆ = 0 and the standard is π, the following conditions
must be satisﬁed in order for the partition {A,B} to represent the types of students
who pass the standard:
u

T − e(a2,π);wh (A,B)

> u

T;wl (A,B)

(3)
u

T − e(a1,π);wh (A,B)

< u

T;wl (A,B)

. (4)
Deﬁne π such that: u

T − e(a2,π);wh (A,B)

= u

T;wl (A,B)

. Hence, us-
ing u1 > 0 and e2 > 0, for any π ∈ [0,π], inequality (3) holds. In the examination of
inequality (4), there are two possible cases:
In the ﬁrst case, u

T − e(a1,b π);wh (A,B)

< u

T;wl (A,B)

. Hence, in-
equality (4) holds for any π > b π. In this case, deﬁne π = b π.
In the second case, u

T − e(a1,b π);wh (A,B)

> u

T;wl (A,B)

. In this case,
deﬁne π such that u

T − e(a1,π);wh (A,B)

= u

T;wl (A,B)

. As u1 > 0 and
e2 > 0, then π > b π.
And, as a2 > a1, then π > π. Then, when π ∈ [π,π], b π 6 π < π, the partition
{A,B} represents the types of students who pass the standard.
Proposition 2 (i) Ω{A,B,C} 6= 0 and contains an open set.
Proof. The following conditions must be satisﬁed in order for partition {A,B,C}
to represent the types of students who pass the standard, with the standard π and the
income inequality ∆:
u

T − e(0,π);wh (A,B,C)

< u

T;wl (A,B,C)

, (5)
u

T − ∆ − e(a2,π);wh (A,B,C)

> u

T − ∆;wl (A,B,C)

(6)
u

T − e(a1,π);wh (A,B,C)

> u

T;wl (A,B,C)

, (7)
u

T − ∆ − e(a1,π);wh (A,B,C)

< u

T − ∆;wl (A,B,C)

. (8)
7Inequality (5) is satisﬁed for any π > 0 as g (.,0) = 0 and e(0,π) = 0. Deﬁne π+
such that:
u

T − e
 
a1,π+
;wh (A,B,C)

= u

T;wl (A,B,C)

.
Due to the fact that u1 > 0 and e2 > 0, then inequality (7) is satisﬁed for any π,
π ∈ [0,π+]. Combining these two conditions, then π has to be in the interval (0,π+].
Deﬁne∆(π)astheincomeinequalitywhenthestandardisπ suchthat: u

T − ∆(π) − e(a1,π);wh (A,B,C)

=
u

T − ∆(π);wl (A,B,C)

. Also deﬁne ∆(π) as the income inequality when the
standard is π such that:
u

T − ∆(π) − e(a2,π);wh (A,B,C)

= u

T − ∆(π);wl (A,B,C)

.
Then, it is straightforward to see that for each π ∈ (0,π+], there is a range for ∆,
∆ ∈ (∆(π),∆(π)], ∆(π) > 0, such that inequalities (6) and (8) are satisﬁed.
Proposition 3 (i) there are ∆, π and π∗, where π∗ > π, such that: (∆,π) ∈ Ω{A,B,C}
and (∆,π∗) ∈ Ω{A,C}; (ii) wh (A,B,C,D) < wh (A,B) and wl (A,B,C,D) <
wl (A,B).
Proof. The proof of (ii) is straightforward. We have:
wh (A,B,C) =
(pA + pB)a2 + pCa1
(pA + pB + pC)
>
pAa2 + pCa1
(pA + pC)
= wh (A,C), as a2 > a1;
wl (A,B,C) =
pDa1
(pD + pE + pF)
<
pBa2 + pDa1
(pB + pD + pE + pF)
wl (A,C), as a2 > a1.
Now we prove (i). The following conditions must be satisﬁed in order for the
partition {A,C} to represent the types of students who pass the standard, with the
standard π and the income inequality ∆:
u

T − e(0,π);wh (A,C)

< u

T;wl (A,C)

, (9)
u

T − ∆ − e(a2,π);wh (A,C)

< u

T − ∆;wl (A,C)

, (10)
u

T − e(a1,π);wh (A,C)

> u

T;wl (A,C)

. (11)
Inequality (9) is satisﬁed for any π > 0 as g (.,0) = 0 and e(0,π) = 0. Deﬁne e π
such that:
u

T − e(a1,e π);wh (A,C)

= u

T;wl (A,C)

.
Due to the fact that u1 > 0 and e2 > 0, then inequality (11) is satisﬁed for any π,
π ∈ [0,e π]. Combining these two conditions, then π has to be in the interval (0,e π]. As
wh (A,B,C) > wh (A,C) and wl (A,B,C) < wl (A,C) and using the deﬁnitions
of e π above and π+ in proposition 2, then e π < π+. Using the deﬁnition of ∆(π)
in proposition 2 and the fact that wh (A,B,C) > wh (A,C) and wl (A,B,C) <
wl (A,C), inequality (10) is satisﬁed for any pair
 
π∗,∆(π)

, where π∗ = π + ε,
π ∈ (0,e π].
8